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CUKRENT LEGISLATION
CIVIL PRACTICE ACT § 344-A-JUDICIAL NOTICE EXTENDED.Upon recommendation of the Judicial Council, the legislature enacted
Section 344-a of the New York Civil Practice Act I which extends
the scope of judicial notice in regard to matters of law, both domestic
and foreign. The statute gives any trial or appellate court the right,
in its discretion, to take judicial notice of the laws of sister states
and foreign countries, 2 private acts of the legislatures of this state
or of the Congress of the United States,3 ordinances of local governments and regulations of administrative boards 4 of this state and of
the United States.5 When a matter of law is judicially noticed, it

'N. Y. Laws 1943, c. 536, § 1, effective September 1, 1943.
§ 344-a. Judicial notice, of matter of law.
A. Except as otherwise expressly required by law, any trial or appellate court, in its discretion, may take judicial notice of the following
matters of law.
1. A law, statute, proclamation, edict, decree, ordinance, or the
unwritten or common law of a sister state, a territory or other
jurisdiction of the United States, or'of a foreign country or. political subdivision thereof.
2. A private act, or resolve of the legislature of this state, or of
the congress of the United States.
3. An ordinance, resolution, by-law, rule or proceeding of the appropriate governing body of any city, county, town or village
within this state.
4. A rule or regulation of an executive department, public board,
agency or officer of this state, or of a city, county, town or village
thereof.
5. A rule or regulation of an executive department of the government of the United States, or a public board, agency or officer
created by law thereof.
B. Whether a matter of law is judicially noticed pursuant to this
section, or formal proof thereof is taken pursuant to other sections of
this act, such law shall be determined by the court or referee and
included in its findings, or charged to the jury as the case may be.
Such finding or charge shall be subject to review on appeal and shall
be known and otherwise treated as a finding or charge on a matter
of law.
C. Where a matter of law specified in this section is judicially noticed,
the court may consider any testimony, document, information or argument on the subject, whether the same is offered by counsel, a third
party, or discovered through its own research.
D. The failure of either party to plead any matter of law specified in
this section shall not be held to preclude either the trial or appellate

court from taking judicial notice thereof.

2N. Y. CIVIwPRAcricE AcT § 344-a, subd. A, 1.

3 Id. subd. A, 2.
4 Id. subd. A, 3 and 4.
5Id. subd. A, 5.
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is to be treated as a matter of law on appeal, and not as a question
of fact. 6 'To determine the law, the court may use any of the methods
previously used to prove matters of law which were not judicially
noticed, or may determine the law through its own research. 7 It is
not necessary for the matter of law to be pleaded and proved.8 In
fact, the lack of a requirement for notice to the opposing party is
conspicuous by its absence.
There is no doubt that our present system of pleading and proving
foreign law as a matter of fact is antiquated. For the statutes and
case law of sister states and foreign countries are no longer matters
of conjecture. Today, except for the slight danger of a typographical
error, the court can easily and surely determine the fact of what the
foreign law is of most jurisdictions.
I
In discussing a new statute the question always arises as to
whether it is constitutional. In other words, has the legislature" the
right under the New York Constitution to extend the scope of
judicial notice to matters of foreign law? It is true that the courts
are, as a rule, slightly behind the times in recognizing those facts
which are apparent and are "known to every man". However, in
the course of time, the courts, with not too great a lag, have judicially
noticed our modem inventions and ways of life. But, nevertheless,
in taking judicial notice of any fact the court? have bound themselves
to those spheres which were within the scope of judicial notice at
6 Id. subd. B. This subdivision takes the place of matter which was deleted from N. Y. Civil Practice § 391, which, as amended by N. Y. Laws
1943, c. 536, § 2 reads as follows (the bracketed matter was deleted) :
Proof of statutes, decrees and decisions of another state or country.
A printed copy of a statute, or other written law, of another state, or of
a territory, or of a foreign country, or a printed copy of a proclamation,
edict, decree or ordinance, by the executive power thereof, contained in a
book or publication purporting or proved to have been published by the
authority thereof, or proved to be commonly admitted as evidence of the
existing law of the judicial tribunals thereof, is presumptive evidence of
the statute, law, proclamation, edict, decree or ordinance. The unwritten or common law of another state, or of a territory, or of a foreign
country, may be proved as a fact by oral evidence. The books of reports
of cases adjudged in the courts thereof must also be admitted as presumptive evidence of the unwritten common law thereof. ,[The law of
such state or territory or foreign country is to be determined by the
court or referee and included in the findings of the court or referee or
charged to the jury, as the case may be. Such finding or charge is subject to review on appeal. In determining such law, neither the trial
court nor any appellate court shall be limited to the evidence produced
on the trial by the parties, but may consult any of the written authorities
above named in this section, with the same force and effect as if the same
had been admitted in evidence.]
7Id. subd. C.
s Id. subd. D.
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common law, such as: history, science, facts of nature, etc. The
courts at common law never judicially noticed foreign law, but always
required that it be pleaded and proved even as any other fact.9
Of course it might be said that the doctrine of judicial notice
is a branch of the law of evidence, and that evidence is adjective
law, and since it is within the province of the legislature to regulate
our procedural law, the state constitution cannot bar this enactment.' 0
But it must be remembered that the doctrine of judicial notice does
not belong to the law of evidence alone. It is a part and process
of judicial reasoning--of the judicial
function itself,,' It is substan2
tive in its properties and effect.1
Therefore, it would seem that this statute violates our constitutional guaranty of trial by jury.
Trial by jury in all cases in which it has heretofore been guaranteed by

constitutional provision shall remain inviolate forever.... 13
If we take the Court of Appeals at its word, foreign law is a question of fact.' 4 The Judicial Council, despite the direct and unequivocal
statement of the court in Read v. Lehigh Valley R. R.,15 takes the view6
that there is much confusion "as to the exact nature of foreign law".'
9Read v. Lehigh Valley R. R., 284 N. Y. 435, 444, 31 N. E. (2d) 891
(1940); Croker v. Croker, 252 N. Y. 24 168 N. E. 450 (1929); Hanna v.
Lichtenhein, 225 N. Y. 579, 122 N. E. 625 (1919).
10 "The general power of the legislature to prescribe rules of evidence and
methods of proof is undoubted .... so long as the legislature, in prescribing

rules of evidence, in either civil or criminal cases, leaves a party a fair opportunity to make his defense and to submit all the facts to the jury to be weighed
by them, upon evidence legitimately bearing upon them, it is difficult to perceive how its acts can be assailed upon constitutional grounds." Board of
Excise Commissioners v. Merchant, 103 N. Y. 143, 148, 8 N. E. 484 (1886).
11 Thayer, Judicial Notice and the Law of Evidence (1890) 3 HARV. L.
REv. 285, 287. Thayer states: "The subject of judicial notice, then, belongs
where the general topic of legal or judicial reasoning belongs,-to that part of
the law which defines among other things, the nature and limitations of the
judicial function. It is, indeed, woven into the very texture of this function.
In conducting a process of judicial reasoning, as of other reasoning, not a step
can be taken without assuring something which has not been proved." Thayer
supports this statement by tracing the doctrine of judicial notice back to the
maxim of civil and canon law, Non refert quid notuin sit judici, si noturm non
sit in fomma judici (It matters not what is known to the judge if it is not
known to him judicially), and to the maxim of common law, Manifesta probaHone non indigent (Manifest things require no proof), and also the pertinent
fact that judicial notice was not mentioned as a part of the law of evidence
until 1824 in Starkie's book.
12 Although twenty-six states have enacted statutes requiring or permitting
their courts to take judicial notice of the laws of sister states or foreign countries, or both, in no case that the authors have been able to find had the constitutionality of these statutes been attacked.
'1 N. Y. CoNsT. Art. I, § 2.
14 See note 9 supra.
'r 284 N. Y. 435, 444, 31 N. E. (2d) 891 (1940).
'16NINTH REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK,
p. 283: "Another aspect of the present rule which would seem to be in need of
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Taking a statement from a case which the court decided thirty-six
years ago that foreign law is essentially a question
of law, the Judicial
17
Council builds up its state of "confusion".
That statement by the court is no more than a mere observation.
It states the obvious, i.e., although foreign law should be a question
of law, we of New York still treat it as a question of fact. And,
even if one takes the view that the Court of Appeals was undecided
as to the nature of foreign law thirty-six years ago, certainly the
unequivocal statement in the Read case 18 should settle the question.
But since foreign law is a question of fact, can we, by legislative
fiat, turn it into a question of law? The danger of allowing a legislature to change questions of facts into questions of law is apparent.
Questions of fact are for the jury. Since foreign law was treated
as a question of fact at common
, we cannot now deprive parties
of their constitutional right of having the jury decide what the foreign
law is.
There is no doubt that the reasons offered by the common law
courts for not judicially noticing foreign law now seem weak and
unconvincing.' 9 Most certainly judicial notice of foreign law is a
goal toward which we must strive not by statute, but by constitutional
amendment.
II
As a concomitant to its theory that foreign law is, in reality, a
matter of law to be decided by the court, the Judicial Council recommended subdivision D of the statute, which states that foreign law
clarification is the confusion as to the exact nature of foreign law. To state

the question, 'Does foreign law present a question of fact or a question [of]
law?' Thirty-six years ago, the Court of Appeals apparently answered the
question when it said, 'It is true the foreign law is ordinarily proved as a fact,
still it is not in its essential nature a fact any more than domestic law is a
fact.' Yet as recently as 1940, the Court of Appeals declared that 'The question of what is the law of the foreign jurisdiction is one of fact', notwithstanding the intervening amendment of 1933 ... decreeing that 'The law of such
[other] state or territory or foreign country is to be determined by the
court. . .

."'

(For the amendment of 1933, mentioned above, see the bracketed

matter in N. Y. Civil Practice Act § 391, supra note 6. This matter was
deleted by N. Y. Laws 1943, c. 536, § 2.)
17 Ibid.
18 See note 9 supra.
19 1 JONES, EvDE TcE (2d ed. 1926) § 402 at p. 708: "As to refusal of
judicial notice of the law of foreign nations, the reasons for the rule are too
obvious to warrant discussion. So great is the variety and so wide the differentiation in the laws governing in various countries that it would be practically
impossible for the courts to bear the burden which notice of such matters
would impose. The situation with regard to notice of the statute law of sister
states is not greatly different. The relationship of the several states, each to
the other, is, in the last analysis, only that of foreign sovereignties in close
friendship. Courts of many jurisdictions, it is true, indulge a presumption in
the absence of proof of the law of a sister state applicable to a case at bar
that such law is the common, or that it is the same as the law of the jurisdic-
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need not be pleaded. 20 The reasoning seems to be that since in
pleadings we only allege the ultimate facts, and since allegations of
law are mere surplusage to be disregarded by the court, there is, then,
no need to allege the foreign law. Even if the theory of the Judicial
Council is accepted, it must be admitted that the statute is most unfair
in the respect that it completely fails to provide for notice to the
opposing party that foreign law is to be relied upon. This lack of
notice may lead to some anomalous situations, two examples of which
follow:
A
P's complaint alleges that P sustained personal injuries and suffered damage therefrom because of D's negligent operation of an automobile in Ontario,
Canada. However, P's complaint also alleges facts which show him to have
been guilty of some contributory negligence.

In New York contributory negligence is a complete bar to P's
recovery. Almost as a matter of course D will move to dismiss
the complaint upon the ground that it does not state facts sufficient
to constitute a cause of action on the face thereof. The court has its
choice of two decisions: (1) It may dismiss the complaint on the
basis of New York law, or (2) under the conflict of laws rule that
in tort the law of the place where the wrong occurred governs, the
court may take judicial notice that Ontario recognizes the doctrine
of comparative negligence, that this is a substantive doctrine; and,
therefore, the court may sustain the complaint on the basis of the
Ontario law.
There is no doubt that the court would be correct in handing
down the first decision; and appeal would be futile. But, under
Section 344-a the second decision is also correct. The court had
the right to take judicial notice of the Ontario law. Up to this
point, seemingly no great injustice has been done. However, there
is no answer to the question as to why the court decided to notice
the foreign law. It must be remembered that on this demurrer there
was only one pleading before the court. There were no affidavits,
no bills of particulars; there was only the complaint. Nowhere was
the court informed that P had decided to rely on the foreign law.
The anomalous aspect of it all is that even though the complaint
was sustained on the basis of Ontario law, P may still come into trial
and try his case on the basis of common law; and after picking a
tion, which presumption, if not rebutted by proof to the contrary, controls.
But such presumptions have no relation to judicial notice. They do not pretend
to amount to cognizance of the actual law of the sister state in question, but
only to substitute a presumption which, on the general average, may serve to
prevent injustice from being done to him who fails to sustain his burden of
proof."
20

See note 1 supra.
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jury, and wasting the state's time and money, be thrown out of court
at this late time for the insufficiency of his complaint.
B
Let us assume one more example. Under the same set of facts
as above, D fails to move for a dismissal of the complaint. Instead
D appears at trial, ready to proceed on the basis of New York law.
P, at trial, asks the court to take judicial notice of Ontario's comparative negligence doctrine, and the court accedes. Here D is surprised
at trial, for he had expected to try his case under the New York law.
Of course it might be argued that New York Civil Practice Act
§ 242 renders surprise at trial impossible. 21 But if that section is
examined, it will be seen that those matters which must be pleaded
are all factual, e.g., statute of frauds, release, or statute of limitations.
Although the last sentence of the section gives the court the power
to extend its operation to matters which are not specifically enumerated therein, nevertheless, it does not seem that this section could
logically be extended to foreign law, which is now a matter of law.
It is possible that the surprise which D suffered was so important
to his defense that he could claim that he was not given a fair hearing, and that, therefore, the "due process" clause of the XIV Amendment of the United States Constitution was violated.
It might be argued that since the statute is discretionary, there
is little chance that it will be used so arbitrarily. However, in testing
the constitutionality of a statute, the courts
look at what may be done,
22
and not at what probably will be done.
Every state which has adopted the Uniform Judicial Notice of
Foreign Law Act provides for notice to the opposing party either
in the pleadings or otherwise. All of the eleven other states with
independent judicial notice statutes require notice to the opposing
party either in the statutes themselves or by judicial construction.
ROBERT NELSON SHIVERTS,
JOHN

A.

DE~mOWICK.

21 Certain facts to be pleaded. The defendant or plaintiff, as the
case may be, shall raise by his pleading all matters which show the action
or counterclaim not to be maintainable, or that the transaction is either
void or voidable in point of law, and all such grounds of defense or
reply, as the case may be, which if not raised would be likely to take the
opposite party by surprise or would raise issues of fact not arising out
of the preceding pleadings, as, for instance, fraud, statute of limitations,
release, payment, facts showing illegality either by statute, common law
or statute of frauds. The application of this section shall not be confined to the instances enumerated.
22 "We measure the validity of statutes, not by what has actually been done
under cover of their provision, but by what with reason may be done." Rosalsky v. State of New York, 254 N. Y. 117, 172 N. E. 261 (1930).

